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Abstract 
 
There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that there has been a determined effort by al-Qaeda, 
and more recently Islamic State, to recruit petty and street criminals into their networks. Despite 
this, and increasing global concern, there exists very little scholarly literature exploring this 
phenomenon, particularly empirically grounded. This paper directly addresses this gap in research, 
and is one of the, if not the, first to present an analysis underpinned by qualitative empirical 
interview data, collected from former extremists and active grassroots workers in the United 
Kingdom. The article determines that through religious and social justifications offered to reduce 
moral concerns, extremists encourage criminals to continue, intensify and diversify their criminality, 
with intentions to fund violent extremist activity, or to create social unrest within society. Rather 
than attempting to change behaviour, this is about reconstructing criminals’ motivations; a 
consideration that has wider implications for counter-terrorism policy and operations. 
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The attempted and successful recruitment of criminals into extremist organisations is visible across a 
plethora of historical examples. The penetration of local criminal structures across Europe and North 
Africa by the Armed Islamic Group1, the relatively high recruitment of ‘early Nazi’ and ‘neo-Nazi’ 
youth with criminal backgrounds2, the global distribution of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam cells 
involved in crime, and the involvement in criminality from groups on both sides during the Troubles3, 
provides some indication of this4. More recently, and in fact historically, increasing evidence 
suggests that those affiliated, ideologically or otherwise, with jihadi organisations like Islamic State 
(IS) and al-Qaeda (AQ), have been purposely attempting to recruit individuals and groups with a 
history of criminality5. 
 
These developing relationships between associates of IS and AQ, and criminals have been 
highlighted as a serious worry by a growing number of states across the world6. Across Europe, 
events in London7, Paris8, and Copenhagen9, demonstrate how monies attained from criminality can 
be used to support aspiring jihadis travelling to Syria to join IS10. Similar, if not more pronounced, 
anxieties are raised with the involvement of former and current criminals in the attempted and 
actual conduct of terrorism in the West11. To this end, recent research has demonstrated that over a 
20-year period, between 1994 to 2013, around 38% of the terrorist plots analysed in Europe were – 
at least partly – funded by petty and street level criminal activity, including drug-dealing, burglary 
and fraud12. This, and wider studies, indicates that certain jihadist networks and organisations 
appear to be placing more emphasis on the recruitment of petty and street level criminals into their 
ranks13, or, at the least encouraging followers to engage in this type of criminality. 
 
This encouragement – and critically the religious and social justifications underpinning this activity – 
is evident in the abundance of extremist material available publically. In a 2010 edition of AQ’s 
‘Inspire’ magazine, for example, Anwar al-Awlaki endeavoured to convince its readers to dispossess 
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the wealth of the ‘disbelievers’14; predominantly due to the foreign policy decisions of their 
governments. IS have adopted similar strategies, evident in a recent 2017 edition of ‘Rumiyah’ 
magazine, making analogous assertions to Inspire and lauding praise on those who continue their 
criminality to further IS causes15. The article stresses to its readers that Muslims living in various 
countries globally are considered to be in a state of ‘Dar al-Harb’, ‘…a land where the blood and 
wealth of its inhabitants are permissible to violate…’16, due to, whether perceived or otherwise, 
these countries being at war with Muslim states, or Muslims, globally. This infers that the ‘wealth of 
the Kuffar is “Ghanimah”, “Fay”, or “Ihtitab”’17; meaning it can be taken with force, without force, or 
deceptively through fraud. 
 
Through the analysis of qualitative empirical data collected with former extremists and those 
working at the grassroots level in the UK, this paper explores the religious18 and social justifications 
of partaking in criminality offered to petty and street level criminals (referred to as ‘criminals’ 
hereafter) by violent extremists affiliated to IS and AQ (referred to as ‘extremists’ hereafter)19. This 
article, then, provides an important contribution to a phenomenon that is – despite increasing global 
concern – significantly under-researched20. There does, however, exist a growing number of studies 
which statistically discuss the involvement of criminals within IS and AQ operations21. Although these 
quantitative based studies have obvious merits, they are unable to provide the particular intricacy 
and depth of analysis which is available from the empirical qualitative data offered within this 
article. As far as can be determined, this is one of the, if not the, first to do so, particularly in the 
context of the United Kingdom. This is especially relevant when considering that this complex and 
highly personal phenomenon, as far as can be determined, is not a widely distributed social issue, 
but occurs in relation to a relatively small proportion of the population. 
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The focus on those affiliated22, either ideologically or otherwise, to both IS and AQ23 within the data, 
and subsequently this article, needs to be mentioned, albeit briefly. Although there are exceptionally 
distinct differences between these two groups across varying considerations, there are a number of 
striking parallels between their associations with criminals and criminality. Critically, in respect to 
this paper, this includes, as confirmed in recent wider research24, distinct overlaps with theological 
and ideological logic towards the justifications and motivations of engaging in criminality. 
 
This paper is set out in three substantive sections. The first, and following section, considers key 
works in this area, with a particular focus upon the crime-terror nexus. The section works to 
demonstrate a gap in research, and outline how this paper will address this issue and contribute to 
this area. The next section discusses the methodology employed to collect the empirical data. The 
final section outlines the key findings from the research. It is primarily argued, here, that in an effort 
to encourage criminals to continue, intensify and diversify their criminality, extremists endeavour to 
further reduce any moral concern criminals may hold of engaging in crime. As mentioned, this is 
undertaken by extremists using religious justifications, i.e. considerations around concepts like Dar 
al-Harb, and social legitimisation, whereby through adherence to global kinship, criminals believe 
they were becoming more altruistic in nature. Funds attained from criminal activity can be used by 
extremists to develop violent extremist activity or create social unrest in the UK; where both 
outcomes work to undermine their ‘enemy’. Finally, a concluding remarks section discusses the 
value of these findings in the context of counter-terrorism policy and operational considerations, 
and how these results can inform critical decision-making. 
 
Extremism and Petty and Street Criminality: A Research Gap 
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When considering the links between extremism, terrorism, and criminality, the concept of the 
‘crime-terror nexus’25 (CTN) is one of the more developed, noteworthy, and obvious approaches 
found within the academic literature. At its very core, the concept maintains that a nexus exists 
between organised crime (predominantly focussed upon maximising profits) and terrorist networks 
(pursuing some type of ideological, religious, spiritual, political, social, or other, objective). 
Essentially, each group is able to adopt one another’s tactics26 or form alliances27 to achieve their 
own particular goals. Some authors even argue that there is the potential for ‘black holes’ to exist, 
where groups’ original boundaries are delineated whereby they demonstrate some of the 
characteristics of the other28. 
 
Evidence of the CTN operating is plentiful, with examples including the narco-cartels and guerrillas of 
Colombia29, the Afghan Taliban30, Republican and Loyalist groups during the Troubles31, Hezbollah32, 
and the Kosovo Liberation Army33. There is also much evidence of jihadi inspired terrorists having 
links to, or engaging in, organised criminal activity, in order to achieve certain objectives. In one 
particular analysis of 40 jihadi cells involved in terrorist plots across Europe, the “second most 
common income source…*was the+ illicit trade of various goods such as drugs, cars, forged 
documents and weapons.”34 The proceeds were used to fund violent extremist activity, including the 
Madrid train bombing in 2004, plots orchestrated by the Hofstad group in Holland, and the attack on 
a kosher supermarket in Paris in 201235. 
 
When considering the premise of this paper, however, there are critical limitations with our 
traditional understanding of the CTN, including its variations, such as the ‘crime-conflict nexus’36, or 
fears of jihadi fighters returning back to their homeland and engaging in criminality (rather than acts 
of terrorism)37. For one, although the theoretical underpinnings of the CTN can be found in academic 
writings dating back decades, there are continuing disagreements to whether it provides relevant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
insight. In fact, as is particularly favoured, some argue that the CTN is overly broad38, or even 
‘overblown’39. 
 
The key concern, however, although relevant for their respective fields, is that these approaches 
tend to concentrate upon organised crime, whereby, as previously mentioned with reference to 
extremist propaganda, and determined in numerous quantitative studies40 of late, certain jihadi 
organisations, like IS, appear to be increasing their focus on recruiting petty criminals41. There is not 
the assumption here that IS’s organised crime intentions have diminished (even though capability 
may well have been due to recent losses on the ground). It is to highlight the distinct lack of 
academic (and policy) attention toward the emergent links between petty and street crime and 
violent extremism; an issue that this paper directly addresses. 
 
As a result, the intricate interplay that develops between extremists and criminals is very rarely, if at 
all, discussed within this context. Basra et al., therefore, suggest that contemporary issues should 
not focus on the convergence of criminal and terrorist organisations, but more of their social 
networks, environments, or milieus42. This is somewhat demonstrated within their own research, an 
approach they term as the ‘new crime-terror nexus’ through the analysis of 79 ‘European jihadists 
with criminal pasts’43. Once again distinguishing this phenomenon from the traditional CTN, the 
authors claim both criminal and terrorist organisations have come to recruit from the “same pool of 
people” 44; an idea corroborated in wider pieces of literature45. This has, according to Basra and 
Neumann, further blurred the lines between crime and extremism, where – considering the recent 
terrorism case studies across Europe – pertinent questions are being asked of whether the 
perpetrator was a criminal, a terrorist, or both46. 
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Although the study lacks some depth, the contribution made by Basra et al.’s work to this highly 
under-researched area should not be underestimated. Critically, their research begins to map out 
some of the key issues associated with this phenomenon. Of particular importance for this article is 
the theme of ‘Radicalisation and Recruitment’, specifically – albeit only very briefly discussed – the 
concept of ‘legitimising crime’ (or justifying crime). Whilst jihadism offered redemption for some in 
their sample, others utilised it to justify the criminal activity they were involved in. This is primarily 
about extremists telling criminals, “‘you do not need to change your behavior, only your motivation.’ 
This could prove to be an incredibly powerful message, as it promises immediate gratification, as 
well as spiritual legitimation for criminal behavior.”47 
 
However, not all, at least historically, have been in agreement in the, albeit scant, literature to 
whether organisations like AQ accommodate the engagement or justification of criminality by its 
adherents. On the one hand, some authors argue that AQ were at one point engaged in vigorous 
screening of its members to ‘weed out…those with criminal pasts’48, as partaking in crime was seen 
as contradictory to the group’s ideology49. Other commentators, such as Dishman50, argue that this 
ideological stance changed after a breakdown in internal hierarchical organisational structure which 
enabled certain terrorist groups, including AQ, to become more able to engage in activity that was 
previously not permitted; including participation in criminality and the recruitment of criminals into 
the group. On the other hand, wider research suggests that AQ have had former and active criminals 
in their ranks since close to the group’s inception51. Broader studies corroborate this, with Bakker’s 
research, for instance, discovering that around a quarter of terrorists sampled, between 2001-2006, 
held criminal records52. 
 
Similar to the latter mentioned studies, with IS, the compatibility of its ideologies with criminal 
activity appears to be more forthright. In addition to the abundance of aforementioned extremist 
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propaganda encouraging participation in crime, more recent quantitative jihadi-profile based studies 
demonstrate increasing numbers of individuals with criminal pasts who have been involved in 
violent extremism53. Anecdotally also, there are various distinct signs of activity which have been 
encouraged by particular ideology justifying criminality. This includes the young British woman who 
claimed it was permissible to take out a student loan to fund travel to join IS, with the intention of 
not paying it back as ‘we are in a state of war’54; relating, as mentioned in the Introduction, to the 
concept of ‘Dar al-Harb’. 
 
This concept of Dar al-Harb, and various other similar religious and spiritual considerations, are 
critical to our understanding of how criminal activity is legitimised through extremist narratives. 
These ideas have, at least, been introduced in certain studies55. However, they lack the depth of 
analysis required to understand in greater detail how they operate and are mobilised. Further, as 
well as focussing on religious justifications offered to criminals to reduce moral concerns of engaging 
in criminality, there also needs to be consideration of the social aspects of motivation change, which 
includes redefining morality and moving from a position of selfishness towards selflessness. These 
religious and social justifications have, to some degree, been considered directly in relation to the 
conduct of terrorism56, though are yet to be fully explored in regards to the legitimisation of 
criminality; a gap in the research that this paper directly addresses and remedies. 
 
This is reflective of the new CTN more generally, where, irrespective of this recent increased 
visibility, or regardless of whether or not this is a new phenomenon, ‘it is clear that the nature and 
dynamics of this [new] crime-terror nexus have been under-researched and poorly understood. 
There is virtually no academic literature on the subject.’57 In addition, despite the recent increased 
attention, ‘empirical works are rare’, where ‘much remains outstanding.’58 Considering these 
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arguments, then, this paper provides a strong evidence-based contribution to the highly under-
researched topic of the new crime-terror nexus, one that is qualitative in nature. 
 
Empirical Data 
 
This paper is informed by empirical data in the form of 31 qualitative semi-structured interviews. 
The intent here was not to conduct a large-scale inquiry across the population, but to ‘drill down’ to 
attain a richer understanding of the issues at hand, from those who have the relevant experience, 
expertise, and exposure. The respondents who participated in this study were, therefore, selected 
on the basis of being – in a similar way to Donald Campbell’s definition – ‘informed informants’59, 
and are referred to as such throughout the article. 
 
The group was purposefully sampled on the basis of having first-hand experience with issues around 
radicalisation and (violent) extremism. Through the UK government’s Channel60 programme or their 
own outreach initiatives, respondents in this sample were in contact and worked closely with those 
considered to be susceptible to extremist ideologies, hold extreme viewpoints/subscribe to 
extremist ideologies, or have been arrested, detained, and possibly incarcerated, under a Terrorism 
Act. In fact, many in the sample regularly conceived and implemented their own intervention and 
organic de-, and often counter-radicalisation strategies61 at the local level. It is also essential to 
outline that almost all of the grassroots workers in this study were former extremists themselves; 
which enabled them to additionally draw upon personal experiences. Further, around a fifth of these 
individuals identified as imams or religious leaders, as well as grassroots workers. 
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However, recruiting these respondents was by no means a straightforward task, as the phenomenon 
of extremism and criminality is not evenly distributed across the population. Thus, as similarly 
argued by Becker62, there is no ‘such officially completed list of participants’. Additionally, the actual 
number of respondents was very limited, with many being dispersed across much of the UK. In order 
to address these particular issues, the study adopted a snowball sampling strategy; an approach 
often embraced in research when respondents are difficult to access63. This commenced with a small 
number of initial seed interviews undertaken with contacts the researcher had acquired during 
previous employment. There were, naturally, various potential negative implications to consider 
with this strategy, including ensuring there is a balanced perspective, or avoiding bias and erroneous 
data. A number of measures were employed to minimise the chance of this occurring, including 
analysing the data across different networks for consistency. 
 
Respondents were, as mentioned above, widely dispersed and based in various cities and towns 
across England and Wales, including London, Cardiff, Birmingham, Newcastle, Blackburn, and Bristol. 
In order to maintain strict confidentiality, specific locations are restricted in the main text. In this 
regard, given the sensitivities attached to this research, it is important to, at least briefly, mention 
the wider ethical governance of the study. There were a multitude of risks and ethical considerations 
that needed to be rigorously analysed in relation to both researcher and respondents. Full ethical 
approval was obtained, and the author was in frequent contact with the appropriate institutional 
research governance team for advice when needed. 
 
It is also important to outline that all of the informed informants were male, due to various reasons. 
Most notably, this reflects the apparent limited number of female grassroots workers operating in 
this particular area, and potentially due to the threat of extremism predominantly emanating from 
men64. However, before the recent fall of IS across Iraq and Syria, there had been growing numbers 
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of Muslim women travelling to join the organisation65, holding various, predominantly non-
combatant roles66. 
 
With the understanding that Muslims are far from a homogeneous group, the respondents came 
from various sects across Islam. This was given due and appropriate thought when considering 
discussions around Islamic jurisprudence during the data collection, though the conversation 
relating to religious justification towards criminal, and more widely violent extremist, activity 
appeared to transcend these boundaries67. In a similar way, as outlined in the introduction of this 
paper, the religious justifications provided by IS and AQ, have distinct overlaps. With similar 
contemplation, the criminals discussed in this account, according to the interviewees, identified as 
being Muslim, regardless of their depth of, and commitment to, religiosity. 
 
Finally, with consideration to the premise of this paper, i.e. the affiliations between extremists and 
criminals, it was difficult to ascertain how widespread the issue actually is, particularly considering 
the qualitative nature of the data collected. However, the informed informants in this study strongly 
felt it was a pressing and critical issue which caused great concern within their own work; a feeling 
that was particularly apparent with the former extremists. These ideas are corroborated in the 
research undertaken by Basra et al. where it is argued that it remains unclear how prevalent the 
issue is, but where ‘the phenomenon has become more pronounced, more visible, and more 
relevant to the ways in which jihadist groups operate.’68 
 
Extreme Criminals: Religious and Social Reconstructions of Criminality 
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The empirical data reported that the criminals described within this account were engaging in 
various acts of criminality. These crimes were thought to be wide-ranging and can be considered in a 
number of different contexts. Drawing distinct parallels with findings in wider studies69, the vast 
majority of illegal activity focussed upon what can be described as petty and street level crimes70, 
predominantly including burglary, theft, fraud, mugging, and the sale of narcotics. 
 
As the criminals discussed within this account were thought to be engaging in criminality prior to 
their affiliation with extremists, it could be argued that they would have, to some greater or lesser 
degree, started to justify this type of activity. It is thought by certain academics that some deviants 
attempt to neutralise moral concerns as they are conscious, to some degree, of their obligations to 
adhere to law and societal norms71. However, the use of the term ‘attempt’ is pivotal here, where 
this task is by no means straightforward. The discipline of criminology is replete with literature 
suggesting criminals harbour some level of moral concern with aspects of the activity they are 
involved in72, with some, in fact, holding ‘moral superiority’, and becoming selective in the illegal 
activity they engage in for that very reason73. 
 
With that in mind, a key theme to emerge from the data related to the alternative modes of 
reducing moral concerns extremists were offering to criminals. As outlined earlier, this 
predominantly concerns religious and social based justifications towards partaking in criminality. 
These ideas were discussed throughout the data collection. During one interview, for example, a 
former extremist elucidated the example of his cousin, who, at one point, was allegedly considered 
to be the ‘right-hand man’ of a violent extremist preacher who has since been implicated in a 
number of terrorist acts. The cousin was, apparently, involved in various criminality prior to his 
contact with the extremist. However, post-affiliation, the extremist provided additional justifications 
for this activity: 
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‘…he was with him probably for a good three, four years, almost like a right-hand man to 
him, my cousin yeah, and interestingly he was up to credit card fraud, all kinds of stuff, all kinds of 
gang related activity…*the extremist preacher+ was giving an Islamic legitimisation to the whole 
thing…’74 
 
The term ‘Islamic justification’ used by the respondent has much relevance here, particularly as it 
was mentioned frequently during the data collection. However, as compellingly argued in wider 
studies of radicalisation, although religion plays a complex75, yet important, role at various junctures, 
it is by no means a causal factor76. Similar assertions can be made with the justification of engaging 
in criminality. These ideas are, generally, divergent to the academic literature on religion and crime, 
where the vast majority attests to the value of religion with achieving intended behaviour and being 
positively related to self-control in society77. Similar deviations can be seen in wider pieces of 
research, including Topalli et al.’s study on Christian ‘street offenders’ which found that although 
many participants displayed a lack of depth in religious knowledge and understanding, they 
attempted to utilise religion to justify criminality78. In fact, Topalli et al. contend that religion can 
have a ‘counterintuitive’ effect which not only allows for criminality, but encourages it. 
 
At the heart of this ‘Islamic justification’ is the concept of ‘Dar al-Harb’. At its very core, it refers to 
the existence of a ‘land of war’ or ‘state of war’. With adherence to this notion, there is a belief that 
when ‘war’ is declared against one Muslim state, or against Muslim populations, then it is a ‘war’ 
against Islam79 itself. In this regard, the argument posited by extremists is simple yet immensely 
effective. That being, if Britain is at war against Muslims elsewhere in the world, then they are also 
at war with Muslims in the UK; as conveyed by a former violent extremist: 
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‘…one of the things they say is “look we’re in a state of war…the Muslim Ummah is one. So, 
if they declare war on [a Muslim country+, they declare war on all of us *Muslims+, so we’re in a state 
of war.”’80 
 
Consequently, those countries in the West, including the UK, are considered to be ‘legitimate 
targets’ of criminality predominantly due to their involvement in conflicts against and within Muslim 
states. As the same respondent quipped, criminals are told, ‘in a state of war you can do all sorts of 
*illegal+ things…”.’81 To them, this implies that British society is in a state of confusion, chaos and 
crisis, where people are permitted to undertake any type of activity needed to ‘survive’. All rules and 
norms cease to exist, as outlined by a grassroots worker from his own experiences of undertaking 
de-radicalisation work in prisons: 
 
‘…in Dar al-Harb you have special conditions…when there is a real land of war you may have 
certain circumstances *where+ you might be allowed to steal to survive, because, you know, it’s a 
land of chaos…which normally in Islam you wouldn’t be allowed in a safe society. Whereas in the 
land of chaos and the land of war some of these things are lifted…So they will apply those conditions 
here, living in this safe environment, they’ll say “no, it’s Dar al-Harb, because these people are 
technically at war with the Muslims”’82 
 
It is also important to pick up on the term ‘…the Ummah is one…’ mentioned by the former 
extremist quoted prior. In Arabic, ‘Ummah’ refers to ‘community’ or ‘nation’, and often discussed as 
‘Ummah wahida’, meaning one community or a nation. Introduced to many Muslims from a young 
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age, the concept forms, as explicated by an imam, the cornerstone of ‘Islamic religious, traditional, 
social, cultural, and on occasion political, beliefs’83. It is by no means a deviant concept, and, in fact, 
it can be argued that it promotes a sense of selflessness. It assumes a deviant dimension when 
considered in conjunction with Dar al-Harb and, of course, used to justify criminality. Extremists are 
aware they need to redefine and reconstruct these ideas for the criminal. As well as attempting to 
further reduce moral concerns about engaging in criminality, this is about attaching these acts to 
notions of altruism and camaraderie. 
 
Those criminals involved in this activity were often requested to donate a percentage of their profit 
to particular agendas or causes outlined by extremists; posited as a requirement of their duty as part 
of the Ummah. One example discussed by a grassroots worker concerned, as he described them, a 
‘street gang’, that he had personal experience with. Members of this group were involved in selling 
narcotics, fraud, and street robbery. The group claimed to be donating a portion of their profits from 
crime to, what they described as, ‘Islamic charities’ based in Muslim states. Here, they considered 
themselves to be ‘Robin Hood’ type figures, whereby they were stealing from the wealthy and 
‘giving money away to the poor’84; a finding demonstrated in wider research on street robbery85. 
Thus, as well as the religious, extremists are now afforded the opportunity to promote social 
justifications for criminality. 
 
However, ideas of altruism were not merely limited to donating to Islamic charities alone. Violent 
extremism, or the potential of it, was also discussed during interviews. Corroborating what has been 
discussed earlier in this paper, and with consideration that much of the conversation at this point 
was, naturally, anecdotal at times, some respondents believed that monies attained from criminality 
were being sent internationally to subsidise terrorist organisations, used to facilitate travel abroad 
whereby people could join terrorist groups, or used to fund domestic acts of terrorism, with the 
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latter not requiring large sums86. In this regard, with strong connotations to the aforementioned 
discussion on ‘Ummah’, several respondents recounted their own experiences, including a 
grassroots worker who reflected back on certain individuals he once engaged with in his own de-
radicalisation work. These individuals, it was claimed, were involved in credit card fraud: 
 
‘…it was claimed the money was going to help the cause and so *they argued+ “we’re taking 
from the oppressors to aid the oppressed and those that are fighting the cause of the oppressed.”87 
 
Another grassroots worker told of a similar situation, though specifically mentioned terrorism as one 
potential objective of the funds: 
 
‘…you can deal drugs as long as you *donate+…so they will use criminal activity to fund 
terrorist activities as well…’.88 
 
Encouraging engagement in criminality goes beyond the aforementioned objectives of the 
extremists; notions that transcend our traditional ideas of terrorism. Through the continuation, the 
intensification and the diversification of criminality, there is the belief held by extremists, at least 
those discussed in the sample, that this will create social unrest within the UK, behaviour that is 
believed to undermine British and Western society. The British state, as well as large swathes of her 
citizens, are considered to be the enemy. A prominent example in the empirical data concerned the 
sale of narcotics, or more so the consequences from its use. As outlined by a number of 
respondents, the narrative provided by extremists is relatively simple. That being, the more drugs 
sold, the more people in society use drugs, the more their ‘enemy’ will suffer: 
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‘…their ultimate thinking as well *is+ you’re corrupting your enemy basically; you’re killing 
your enemy through drugs’89 
 
Respondents spoke frequently of examples where the underlying aim of the criminality was to 
create social unrest in society, or in some way to further destabilise the enemy. One particular 
account, of benefit fraud90, elucidated by a respondent, further demonstrates this. Speaking of a 
group he had personally dealt with in his capacity as a grassroots worker, one member worked in 
the local ‘benefits office’ and was administering fraudulent cheques. It was claimed that their motive 
was to ‘undermine the British government’91. 
 
This does, however, highlight, one of the contradictions that exists with this type of activity. It 
cannot be assumed that criminals acting under the guidance and justification of extremists are doing 
so in the perceived interests of all of their Muslim kin, as the Ummah paradigm insinuates. For 
instance, for those selling narcotics, the end users may well be Muslim themselves. The victims of 
terrorist attacks could be Muslim. The victims of fraud could be Muslim. These considerations have 
been documented in previous research on radicalisation92, which explicates there are often 
conflicting and contradictory stances towards how Muslims are viewed by extremist groups; where 
those who do not subscribe to the extremist group’s ideologies, whether Muslim or otherwise, are 
considered to be part of the issue, rather than the solution. Much of this alludes to the ‘us vs. them’ 
hypothesis; considered to play a key role in the process of radicalisation93. Here, criminals 
increasingly believe they are working towards furthering the cause of their new perceived ‘in-group’, 
in turn causing increased polarisation with the ‘out-group’94, where the out-group involves all 
(including fellow Muslims) who do not subscribe to the group’s ideologies. 
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Nevertheless, it appears that criminals are provided with opportunities to help further, or achieve, 
extremists’ causes, aims and objectives, without radically changing their activities. This goes back to 
the previous argument that extremists purvey to criminals that they need not change their 
behaviour, but simply their motivation95. It can be argued, then, that ‘the delinquent both has his 
cake and eats it too’96. It can also be said, considering this, that those extremists discussed within 
this paper are not pushing, at least initially, great changes on to those involved in criminality, 
particularly as they have been involved in crime prior to their affiliation. Similar to the hypothesis 
outlined by Milgram97, it is the case of building upon reassurances provided by past actions for 
future ones. 
 
However, this change of motivation is, with some criminals, not as straightforward as others. There 
is, in a sense, some overlap with the theoretical underpinnings of the traditional CTN here, where 
groups, or individuals, “move back and forth…ebbing and flowing between ideological and profit 
motives.”98 These relationships are sometimes complex, and even contradictory. According to the 
data, criminals did not always donate proceedings from crime to the extremists’ causes; alluding to 
the notion that involvement with extremism is not cleanly grounded in ideology99. Thus, on occasion, 
certain criminals appeared to be embracing the justifications offered to them for engaging in crime, 
‘though will keep the money’.100 It was alleged that some of these funds were used, as corroborated 
in wider research101, for ‘partying’ and other hedonistic vices, where criminals were described as 
‘living it up!’102. 
 
The allure of personal rewards extends further. The recurring example presented within the 
empirical data referred to the afterlife. As found in wider narratives on radicalisation103, respondents 
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claimed criminals were being offered, more so promised, additional benefits. As well as believing 
they are now undertaking their criminality for a righteous cause, these included afterlife rewards: 
 
‘You don’t have to worry about all those lives you took, all those families that you destroyed, 
those individuals that are now addicted to all types of drugs and what not, and those people that are 
scared to leave their home because of you. Because now you’ve rectified your situation and you can 
still be a thug, [but now] for a good cause. Your thuggery [sic] will have some meaning…And you’re 
going to go to heaven for it…’104 
 
When considering traditional research on the role of religion within criminality, it is, more often than 
not, presumed that punishment in the afterlife serves as a deterrent to committing crime. Those 
that are involved are often fully conscious of these castigations105. Extremists are aware of these 
anxieties and attempt to not only neutralise them, but also reconstruct these ideas as being morally 
positive by stressing that engagement in criminality is considered to be a ‘form of worship’106.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This article has argued that violent extremists in the UK are offering petty and street criminals 
religious and social justifications for engaging in criminality, in a bid to reduce any residing moral 
concerns the criminal may hold for committing these illegal acts. This is not about changing the 
criminals’ behaviour, quite the contrary. It is about reconstructing ideas and perceptions of crime 
and its consequences and, importantly, altering people’s motivations behind committing crime to 
align more with the extremist groups’ ideologies. Membership within this new subculture107 
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provides the criminal with a new moral compass, where their criminality is now perceived to be for 
the greater good and altruistic in nature; at least in accordance with the ideologies of the extremist. 
If extremists are successful with achieving this, then possible outcomes, i.e. those based around 
potentially funding violent extremism through criminal activity or achieving social unrest in society, 
could be devastating. 
 
Alongside contributing to a significantly under-researched scholarly area, there are wider 
implications for the findings of this research; cutting across policy and operational contemplations. 
Developing our understanding of the alternative ways in which people could become affiliated to 
extremists and also potentially to extremism provides a better insight of how we can begin to 
address these threats. This needs to be reflected, and addressed directly, within relevant counter-
terrorism policy, though rarely, if at all, is108. In addition, in an operational sense, these developing 
relationships between extremists and criminals work to demonstrate the ever-increasing 
requirement to ensure there is continuing and improved communication within and across agencies 
on this and similar issues109. Research conducted at the local-level on preventing violent extremism 
reinforces this, where, due to various gaps in co-production within and across agencies, there is a 
fear that individuals at risk can slip through the proverbial net110. This of course includes co-
operation between different states. In addition, it can be argued that building a richer and more 
comprehensive picture of the current threat can assist security agencies with critical decision-
making. The case of Anis Amri, who used a truck to kill 12 and injure scores more at a Berlin 
Christmas market in 2016, provides a good illustration of this. Due to a number of incidents and 
affiliations, Amri was known to police and intelligence agencies within Germany, and across Europe. 
However, it has been claimed that due to Amri’s involvement in dealing and consuming drugs, he 
was not considered to pose an immediate threat111. In reality, he was merely months away from 
committing an attack. The situation may well have been, of course, far more complex than this, with 
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security agencies becoming increasingly aware of the developing affiliations between crime and 
extremism. However, at the same time, there is little doubt that providing additional insight on this 
issue could contribute, in some minor or major way, to preventing future attacks. 
 
Finally, something can be said for how this research stream could be developed moving forward. 
There are numerous aspects that deserve further empirical exploration; the religious and social 
justifications of engaging in criminality, as discussed within this article, merely forms one part of the 
phenomenon. One key area of investigation would consider how these developments both impact 
and advance our understanding of radicalisation112. It is by no means claimed that all criminals go 
through the same processes when affiliated to extremists. Nor is it implied in this account that all 
criminals within this context will become radicalised whereby they internalise violent extremist 
ideologies and potentially participate in acts of terrorism. It is widely agreed that radicalisation is not 
a linear process, nor is it a conveyor belt system113, nor does it rely solely on ideological commitment 
alone114. What can be said, however, is that as this relationship develops between the extremist and 
criminal, the former is afforded greater opportunity to propagate wider ideologies. How this process 
cultivates and develops needs further investigation. 
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